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רית הספר ללימוד חברה ומדיניות The Gershon H. Gordon הפקולטה למדעי החברה ע"ש גרשון גורדון אוניברסיטת תל אביב

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Peace Index, August 2019

- About one week before the elections, a quarter of the public in Israel prefer a rightwing government led by the Likud and another quarter prefer a center-left government headed by the Blue-White party. More than half of the Jewish public prefer a government under Likud leadership while about two-thirds of the Arab public prefer a center-left government. The widespread appraisal is that the Likud will establish the next government.
- About half of the Israeli public say that they will vote in accord with their ideological preference, and a quarter say that they will vote strategically for the largest party in the bloc which they support in order to increase its chances of establishing a government.
- All of the various sectors of the Israeli public clearly reject the call by Netanyahu to boycott Channel 12.
- The Israeli public is divided almost equally between those who feel that the agreements between Netanyahu and Feiglin are proper and those who reject these agreements as improper.
- More than half of the Jewish public believe that the Joint Arab List should not be allowed to participate in the elections to the Knesset. In contrast, only a quarter believe that the Otzma Yehudit party should not be allowed to participate. Half of the Arab public feel that Otzma Yehudit should not participate, while a clear majority feel that the Joint Arab List should participate.
- About half of the Jewish public think that Netanyahu's decision not to initiate a wide-ranging military operation in Gaza stemmed from practical-security considerations, while about half of the Arab public feel that his considerations were connected to the coming elections. Despite the relatively increasing proximity between the United States and Iran, about half of the general Israeli public believe that Israeli policy towards Iran will not affect its political-security situation.
- The preferred solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among the general Israeli public remains the two-state solution, although even that solution does not have majority support. Nevertheless, about half believe that the present situation will
- The measure of support for and belief in negotiations with the Palestinian Authority has declined to its lowest level in several decades.
- With the opening of the school year, about half of the Jewish public think that the professional level of Israeli teachers and their image as educators is appropriate. However, about half of the Jewish public feel that teachers' salaries and status is not as it should be. Among the Arab public, it is clear that their attitudes towards

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teachers are more uniform – the status of the teacher and his/her image as a professional and as an educator are stable, and their salaries are viewed as appropriate.

Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Dr. Nimrod Rosler

The coming elections

Which government is most desirable after the coming elections: The Peace Index which took place on 3-5 September, that is, about two weeks before the elections, shows that, from among six coalition alternatives presented to the respondents, the most preferred were, on the one hand, a government headed by the Likud with the ultra-Orthodox parties, and on the other hand, a center-left government led by the Blue-White party without the ultra-Orthodox parties. Each of these alternatives received 24%. Following these, in descending order were a government headed by the Likud with the Blue-White party but without the ultra-Orthodox parties (15%), a government under the Blue-White party with the Likud, but without the ultra-Orthodox parties (14%), a government led by the Likud with Blue-White and with the ultra-Orthodox parties (8%) and a government headed by Blue-White with the Likud and the ultra-Orthodox parties (2%).

When examining the Jewish and Arab respondents separately, the results, as expected, are completely different. The Jewish public find a Likud government with the participation of the ultra-Orthodox as most desirable (29%) and afterwards, in descending order, a government headed by the Likud with the Blue-White party and without the ultra-Orthodox parties (16%), a government under Blue-White, with the Likud but without the ultra-Orthodox parties (15%), a government led by the Likud with the Blue-White party and with the ultra-Orthodox (10%), and a government headed by Blue-White with the Likud and the ultra-Orthodox (3%).

Among the Arab public, the preferred government with absolute certainty is a center-left government under Blue-White without the ultra-Orthodox parties (65%), and afterwards, a Blue-White government with the Likud and without the ultra-Orthodox (9%), and a Likud government with Blue-White but without the ultra-Orthodox (2.5%). The other three government alternatives received less than 1% support.

In a comparison of the two groups, it is clear that, in contrast to the Arab public, who prefer only one possible government, for obvious reasons – a center-left government led by Blue-White and without the ultra-Orthodox parties – in the Jewish public, there is greater variation among the preferred governments. However, the tendency to prefer a Likud government which became apparent in previous months (57%), has remained this month as well. While right-wing people clearly prefer a right-wing government led by the Likud with the ultra-Orthodox parties (56%),

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and left-wing people prefer a center-left government led by the Blue-White party without the ultra-Orthodox parties, among the moderate rightists, their preferences are divided between a right-wing government (27%) and a government led by the Likud with Blue-White and without the ultra-Orthodox (27%). Among centrists, preference is divided between a government headed by Blue-White with the Likud and without the ultra-Orthodox (32%), and a center-left government (31%).

Which government has the best chance of being formed: In the general public, the leading response was that a government led by the Likud with the ultra-Orthodox parties would most likely be formed (43%), a figure higher than the percentage of those who wanted such a government (that is. 24%). The chances that any other of the alternative governments will be formed are very much lower, ranging from 13% to 5%. A comparison between the Jewish public and the Arab public shows that both similarly considered that a right-wing government under the Likud with the ultra-Orthodox parties had the best chances of being formed (46% among the Jews and 29% among the Arabs). In other words, despite preference to the contrary, the Arab public considered that this government had the greatest chances of being formed, although at a much lower rate than among the Jewish public. The chances of all other possible governments are much lower in the opinion of both publics (between 14% and 3%).

Considerations in deciding which party to vote for: In the general Israeli public, 53% of respondents would vote for the party closest to their own positions, unconnected to the party's chances to form the next government ("the ideological consideration") and 25% would vote for the largest party in the bloc they supported in order to increase the party's chances to form the next government ("the strategic consideration"). Ten percent stated that they had other considerations, and the other respondents did not intend to vote or refused to respond. An identical pattern of scaling considerations appeared both among the Jewish and Arab publics, although the ideological consideration was more dominant among the Arab public (61%) than among the Jewish public (51%).

Participation of the Otzma Yehudit Party and the Joint List in the Knesset elections: In the general Israeli public, most (52%) opposed disqualification of Otzma Yehudit contrasted to 31% who supported disqualification. A contradictory pattern of responses was received regarding the Joint Arab List, as 47% supported disqualification, and 43% opposed disqualification.

A similar but sharper pattern was received when examining the two groups separately. In the Jewish public, 57% opposed disqualifying Otzma Yehudit (while 27.5% supported disqualification) and 33% were opposed to disqualifying the Joint Arab List (while 58% supported disqualification). Among the Arab public, 28% opposed disqualifying Otzma Yehudit ••• The Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Management



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(while 50% supported disqualification) and 92% opposed disqualifying the Joint List (while 2% supported disqualification).

The agreement between Netanyahu and Feiglin: Netanyahu and Feiglin reached agreement that, in return for the withdrawal of the Zehut Party from the coming election, legalization of medical cannabis would be advanced. In addition, Netanyahu announced that he viewed Feiglin as a minister in the next government he would establish. Therefore, we asked, "In your opinion, is this agreement proper or improper?" The responses indicate that, in the general Israeli public, opinions are divided almost equally, with a small advantage to those who negate the agreement (44%) in comparison to those who viewed it positively (39%). When examining the opinions of the Jewish public, the gap between those who think the agreement is proper and those who do not is only 2%, so that there is actually "a tie" between the two opinions. As expected, most Likud voters support their leader and believe that the agreement is proper (61%) in comparison to 23% who believe that it is improper. Among the Arab public, on the other hand, the rate of support (24%) is much lower than those who oppose the agreement (46%).

Netanyahu's policies

Netanyahu and the media: The prime minister called on the public and ordered Likud ministers to boycott Channel 12 because they broadcast the series "Our Boys", and due to their publicizing leaks from Netanyahu's investigations, which he termed "terrorist attacks". We asked: "In your opinion, in a democratic state, is it right or wrong for a prime minister to call for a boycott of a broadcasting channel for publicizing material which does not break any law?" The responses indicate that, in the general Israeli public, as in the Jewish and Arab publics separately, a sizeable majority feel that Netanyahu's call to boycott Channel 12 was improper. In the general public, 68% feel this way, in the Jewish public, 66%, and in the Arab public, 80%. Netanyahu's call does not receive support among any of the ideological groups in the Jewish public, as, among rightists, 44% reject the call to boycott (while 41% support it), and the gap is even larger among the other groups: 69% of the moderate rightists oppose the call to boycott (23% support), 79% of centrists oppose (12% support) and 97% of leftists oppose (3% support).

Netanyahu's policy towards Hamas: In response to the question, "In your opinion, what is the reason that the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, did not initiate a wide-ranging military operation against Hamas, like the Protective Edge operation?" Among the general Israeli public, 48.8% responded that Netanyahu was acting from practical-security considerations and that, in the present situation, it was preferable to avoid such an operation, while 37.5% considered that he feared that this would harm his chances in the coming elections. The rates in the Jewish public ••• The Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Management



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were 54% in contrast to 34.5%, while in the Arab public, the responses tended to be in the opposite direction, as 24% responded that Netanyahu was acting from practical considerations in contrast to 52% who believed that he avoided a military operation because he feared that it would harm his chances in the elections.

Israel, the United States and Iran: According to reports in the Israeli and the American media, there has recently been a certain warming in relations between the United States and Iran. In addition, the United States has expressed opposition to the air force attacks carried out by Israel in Iraq, which contradicted United States interests. Therefore, we asked, "In your opinion, how, if at all, will these developments affect the political-security situation of Israel, if Israel continues its present policies towards Iran?" About half of the respondents (48%) considered that this would not affect Israel's situation while about a quarter (28%) thought that it would have a negative effect and a quarter (24%) either did not know or refused to answer. A similar pattern of responses was received from Jewish respondents (46%, 30% and 24%, respectively) and from the Arab public (34%, 20% and 26%, respectively).

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The desired solution: We presented respondents with four possible solutions to the conflict and we asked whether they supported or opposed them. The solution which received the highest support among the general Israel public was the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel (44%), and following that, annexation of the territories and the establishment of one state under Israeli rule with limited rights for Palestinians (32%), continuing the existing situation (25%) and establishment of a bi-national state between the Jordan and the Mediterranean with full and equal rights for Jews and Palestinians (22%). When comparing the measure of support for each solution among the Jewish public and the Arab public, similar tendencies can be seen, although with different rates of support and opposition, to annexation of the territories (34% compared to 58% respectively among the Jewish public, and 18% compared to 66% respectively among the Arab public), as well as support versus opposition for continuing the present situation (27% and 64% respectively among the Jewish population, 14% and 78% respectively among the Arab population). In contrast, there are opposite trends in support versus opposition to the two state solution (39% and 54% respectively among the Jewish population, in contrast to 73% and 17% respectively among the Arab public) and to the binational state (15% and 77% respectively among the Jewish population, in contrast to 60% and 24% respectively among the Arab public). In summary, it again becomes clear that there is massive support among Arabs for the two-state solution in contrast to the absence of an agreed upon solution among the Jewish public. However, interestingly, the greatest support in the

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Jewish public is for the two-state solution, which, as noted, is the solution supported by the great majority of the Arab public.

Which of the solutions has the best chance of being realized in the foreseeable future? The solution with the greatest chances of being realized among both the Jewish (48%) and the Arab (56%) publics is a continuation of the existing situation, In other words, neither of the two publics believe that the solution they support has a great chance of being realized.

The educational system

Against the backdrop of the beginning of the school year, we asked the respondents' opinion about the following:

- a. **Teachers' salaries**: Among the Jewish public, 56% think that teachers' salaries are not appropriate, while 34% believe that they are appropriate. In contrast, among the Arab public, 64% feel that teachers receive appropriate salaries, while 25% feel that teachers' salaries are inappropriate.
- b. The status of teachers in Israeli society: Most of the Jewish public (54%) think that the teachers do not receive appropriate status in Israel, while 41% think that teachers' status is appropriate. Among the Arab public, a great majority (72%) think that, in Israel, teachers' status is appropriate while only 22% believe the opposite.
- c. **Teachers' professional level**: Half of the Jewish public consider that the professional level of teachers is appropriate, while 42% think that it is not appropriate. Among the Arab public, the percentages are 76% and 16% respectively.
- d. **The teacher as an educational figure**: Most of the Jewish public (57%) are of the opinion that Israeli teachers are appropriate educational figures, while 37% hold the opposite opinion. The percentages among the Arab public are 75% and 20% respectively.

In summary, while half of the Jewish public believe that teachers in Israel have an appropriate professional level and are appropriate educational figures, half also believe that the salaries and status of teachers in not appropriate. Among the Arab public, it is clear that attitudes towards teachers are more uniform – the status of teachers and their perception as professionals and as educational figures are stable, and their salaries are perceived as appropriate.

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Negotiation Index:

General sample: 42.6 (a decrease of 1.5 points from last month)

Jewish sample: 39.6 (a decrease of 3.2 points from last month)

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The negotiation index is calculated by a weighing two questions: Level of support for negotiation with the Palestinian Authority, and level of trust that negotiation with the Authority will lead to peace in the coming years.

The Peace Index is conducted by the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Management at Tel Aviv University and the Midgam Consulting and Research Institute headed by Mano Geva. The survey was conducted by telephone and internet on 3-5 September 2019, among 600 respondents, a representative sample of the entire adult population (ages 18 and over) in Israel. Maximum margin of error for the entire sample is +/-4.1% at a confidence level of 95%. Statistical analysis: Ms. Yasmin Alkalay.

Diagram of the month: (Following Netanyahu's call to boycott Channel 12) In your opinion, in a democratic state, is it justified or unjustified for a prime minister to call for a boycott of a broadcasting channel for publicizing material which does not break any law?

