RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM AND THE ROLE OF POSITIONAL DEPRIVATION AND INEQUALITY

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ABSTRACT
This paper explores how support for radical right populist parties may be shaped by new measures of deprivation and inequality based on growth-incidence-curves, gauging growth in real household income across a country’s income deciles and calculating a given decile’s gains relative to the gains of other deciles. The paper argues that such positional measures capture drivers of economic resentment relevant to radical-right populism. First, radical right populism is more likely among individuals facing more ‘positional deprivation’, those in deciles with gains that are smaller than the gains of the average, richest or poorest deciles in their own country. Second, subjective low income more strongly spurs support for radical right populist parties in polities with higher ‘positional inequality’, where the wealthiest deciles experience greater gains than (or suffer less than) the median or poorest earners. The paper tests these expectations using individual-level survey data from sixteen European countries. It finds support for the arguments, not only in patterns of support and voting for parties in the radical right party family but also in patterns of support and voting for parties expressing more anti-globalization nationalism and authoritarianism in their party manifestos.

Keywords: politics, electoral, voter, income distribution, radical-right populism, positional deprivation

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1. INTRODUCTION

The rise of radical right populist parties and electoral programmes surely rates as among the most important developments in recent European political economy. Such radicalism has long simmered in Europe’s post-War electoral politics, but the gains for radical right parties and programmes have in recent years broadened and deepened. The broadening has touched countries that long resisted the radical-right tide, like Germany and its Alternative for Germany (AfD). The radical right’s programmatic positions and rhetoric may also have spread to party programmes of mainstream parties of the Center-Right and Left, such as the UK’s Conservative and Labour Parties, respectively. The deepening involves the sustained and repeated gains achieved by the radical right, including the Danish Freedom Party (DF), France’s Front National (FN), the Netherlands’ Party of Freedom (PVV), Italy’s Northern League (LN) and Austria’s Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Despite many differences among such parties, the broadening and deepening involves programmatic embrace of economic and political nationalism and euroscepticism (Hooghe et al., 2002; Ford and Goodwin, 201; Visser et al. 2014), anti-multiculturalism and anti-immigration (Ivarsflaten 2008), authoritarianism (Mudde 2007; Inglehart and Norris 2016), and anti-elite populism (Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015; March and Mudde 2005). Such positioning poses major challenges to policies long defining Western-democratic polities, and may have unleashed potentially deeper challenges to the integrity of democracy itself.

Such developments justify the extensive academic attention exploring the underpinnings of voting for such parties, including the possible role of economic conditions and insecurities. Progress in such inquiry hinges on identifying economic conditions most relevant to radical-right voting. Existing studies have focused on individual- and aggregate-level conditions like income, unemployment, exposure to trade shocks, education, and aggregate inequalities that might well be relevant to radical resentments (cf. Betz 1994; Kriesi et al. 2008; Colantone and Stanig 2017; Autor et.al. 2016; Rydgren and Ruth 2013). These conditions, however, do not directly touch-upon the expressed resentments of many populist supporters which consists of the feeling of ‘losing-out’, not only compared to one’s own past but also relative to other groups in society – that is, a combination of over-time and relative loss.

This paper focuses more precisely on such combined dynamic and positional experience, and argues that measures of such a combination may help explain support for
radical-right populist parties. In particular, how resentful or deprived a voter is can be expected to be strongly rooted in the changes in disposable household income for that voter’s income group relative to the changes in income experienced by other groups in the same society, including a country’s poorest and richest income groups. Building on this intuition, the paper uses Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data to measure changes in real household income across deciles in a given country-year for sixteen European countries between the 1980s and 2010. These data provide a basis for generating measures of ‘positional deprivation’ and ‘positional inequality’: positional deprivation gauging how much a given voter’s decile has experienced real income growth that is outstripped by the growth of other deciles in the country’s income distribution; and positional inequality measuring for a given country and year the gap in the growth (or decline) of the wealthier deciles relative to the growth (decline) of poorer deciles.

Based on such measures, we develop and test two sets of hypotheses. The first set expects that individuals facing greater positional deprivation – that is, those in deciles experiencing lower gains than the gains of other deciles (the average, median, poorest, etc.) – are more likely to support parties with radical-right populist orientations. This should show-up in support for or voting for parties classified in the ‘radical right populist’ party family (Hypothesis 1a), and it should show-up in support for parties whose party programmes (or manifestos) are more anti-globalization or nationalist-authoritarian in orientation (Hypothesis 1b). Our second set of expectations focus on aggregate-level positional inequality – the extent to which a given country-year is marked by richer deciles having fared better than poorer deciles. We expect such positional inequality to exacerbate the tendency of subjectively poorer individuals to support radical-right parties. This interaction-effect should show-up in support for radical-right parties (Hypothesis 2a), and for any party with more anti-globalization, nationalist and authoritarian policy positions (Hypothesis 2b). We expect that positional deprivation and inequality spur support for radical-right populism, net of standard economic factors, like individual education, employment, or subjective wellbeing, or aggregate-level economic growth or inequality.

The paper tests these arguments by matching measures of positional deprivation and inequality to five waves of European Social Survey (ESS) data on individual support and voting for parties in sixteen European countries. This allows us to examine how positional deprivation and inequality influences support and voting for parties widely coded as radical-right populist. Going beyond most voting studies, however, we also match our LIS and ESS
data to data on the substance of party platforms coming from the Manifesto Project Database (MPD). This allows us to judge respondents’ party preferences in terms of systematic coding of the anti-globalization, nationalist and authoritarian content of a given party’s platform – including over-time variation and the positioning of all parties, radical-right and mainstream.

The resulting analysis yields broad support for our expectations, particularly regarding positional deprivation. Net of other economic measures like unemployment, growth and inequality, respondents whose own decile has experienced less growth or more decline than others in their own country’s income spectrum are more likely to support radical-right parties. And respondents that believe that they have a low income are more likely to turn to radical right parties in settings where the wealthier deciles are doing better than the poorer deciles. These patterns hold with respect to “support” for parties – that is, parties to which respondents feel closest affinity – and also to the parties for which respondents last voted. Our hypotheses find more mixed support in the second test, where we construe a respondent’s voted-for or supported party in terms of that party’s platform statements on what we shall call ‘net nationalist autarchy’: statements supporting anti-globalization, pro-nationalism and authoritarianism, net of statements in the opposite direction. We find that positional deprivation directly spurs voting for parties expressing more ‘net nationalist autarchy’. But higher aggregate positional inequality only weakly and often insignificantly exacerbates the tendency of subjective low-income to spur support for parties whose platforms express more ‘net nationalist autarchy’. Taken together our results support the view that particularly positional deprivation may be an important wellspring of radical-right populism in Europe.

2. THE RADICAL RIGHT AND THE NEED FOR ATTENTION TO SIMULTANEOUSLY DYNAMIC AND POSITIONAL MEASURES

The enormous literature on the origins of radical right populism has revealed economic discontent, deprivation and inequalities to be important to radical-right populist parties and ideas. We know that individual economic insecurities, grounded in socio-economic class, unemployment and, particularly, low income, are predictors of voting radical right (see Lubbers et al., 2002; Werts et al., 2013; Rydgren, 2013). We also have evidence that negative economic shocks associated with economic globalization spur electoral support for radical-right populist parties and anti-globalization positioning (Swank and Betz 2003; Kriesi et al. 2008; Burgoon 2009; Autor et al. 2016; Colantone and Stanig 2017). Studies have also explored the role of macro-level economic conditions like GDP per-capita, regional growth,
or inflation (Van der Brug et al. 2005; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Rydgren and Ruth 2013); income inequality (Coffé et al. 2007; Jesuit, Mahler and Paradowski 2008; Pontusson and Rueda 2010; Han 2016); and aggregate unemployment shaping nationalist radical-right support (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Knigge 1998; Golder 2003; Lubbers et al. 2002; cf. Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Ford and Goodwin 2010; Inglehart and Norris 2016). However, evidence with regard to the direction and strength of such effects, particularly for macro-level economic conditions, has been very mixed (Arzheimer 2009; Rydgren and Ruth 2013; Han 2016; Rooduijn and Burgoon, 2017).

An important problem, however, is that the economic conditions receiving the most systematic attention do not fully link-up to the distinct combination of dynamic (over-time) and positional (inter-group) economic anxieties that journalistic and qualitative studies suggest are at play for many right-wing populist voters. Extensive reporting has chronicled the role of real and perceived losses in economic standing driving political disenchantment, where citizens feel discarded for their skills or economic value (Wallace-Wells 2017; Beauchamp 2017a, 2017b; Lozada 2016). These same journalists, however, also chronicle how frustrated groups decry their unfair economic position relative to particular other groups in the polity or world. The dynamic and relative, hence, come-together to shape radical revolt (Beauchamp 2017a, 2017b; Lozada 2016). Recent qualitative case and ethnographic work exploring anti-elite resentments and populism highlights this combination of dynamic and positional misfortune (Hochschild 2016; Gest 2016; Cramer 2016a). Cramer’s case study on the politics of resentment in Wisconsin finds people worried about increasingly scarce health care, jobs, and taxation in rural places, combined with ‘a deeply felt sense of not getting their “fair share”…’ (Cramer 2016b). Hochschild (2016) echoes this finding, famously culminating in the ‘line-cutter’ metaphor: Many citizens feel as if they are waiting longer and longer in a line for something that they deserve, while undeserving people cut in and are allowed to do so, unfairly slowing the line’s progress.

The combination of dynamic and positional economic misfortune gets only partially captured by well-studied measures of income, unemployment, inequality, or skill-level. These latter highlight the dynamic OR the positional, not both simultaneously. Measures of income growth (e.g. GDP growth), for instance, capture dynamic, year-on-year development, but do not directly gauge how this dynamic compares to the dynamic for others. And measures of income inequality – such as GINI-indices or polarization measures (e.g. 90th to 10th income ratios) capture relative position, but lack explicit attention to over-time dynamics.
The shortcoming also applies to some of the most innovative recent explorations of economic misfortune. For instance, recent exploration of ethnic-based “horizontal inequality” have clarified economic frustrations underlying conflict (e.g. Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011) but continue to lack an explicit over time dimension. And recent innovations in clarifying over-time dynamics such as Case and Deaton’s (2017) discussion of “cumulative disadvantage” in the labour-market experience of some socio-demographic groups, and Margalit’s (2013) evocative analysis of rare panel-data clarifying within-subject over-time changes in income, employment, and economic insecurity in the United States, leaves out the positional aspect of economic suffering – how one is doing relative to others in society.

To the best of our knowledge, the studies that most explicitly combine the dynamic and the positional are those focused on “growth incidence curves”, which are measures of income growth across subsets of the income distribution (Ravallion and Chen 2003). These have informed many studies of economic development and economic policy, but they have not been much applied to studies of political economy. An exception is Bartels’s (2008) study of how changes in disposable income vary across the US income distribution and across presidencies or periods of legislative control. More broadly, Branko Milanovic’s study of global-level inequalities – allowing comparison of the poorest Indian with the richest American – included creation of the first-ever global growth-incidence-curves of cross-centile real earnings for the whole world economy (Milanovic 2013; Lakner and Milanovic 2015). This yielded, among other patterns, the now-famous ‘elephant curve’. where the world’s middle class (disproportionately capturing China’s rising middle class) is shown to have experienced very high changes in disposable income while the world’s upper-middle class (disproportionately lower middle classes in Western economies) have seen among the lowest gains across the world’s income distribution (Lakner and Milanovic 2015, p. 216). These studies highlight over-time and positional dynamics of economic deprivation and inequality in single, isolated countries and time-periods, or in truly global economic experience. They have not yet been leveraged to create single-measure quantification of the combination of dynamic and positional misfortune comparable across a range of countries. They are less suited, hence, to the challenge of understanding the underpinnings of Europe’s radical populism, which intuitively rests on individual and national political-economic experiences combining the dynamic and positional.
3. POSITIONAL DEPRIVATION AND INEQUALITY AS SOURCES OF RADICAL RIGHT POPULISM

We attempt to gain a more dynamic and positional understanding of the roots of radical right populism by introducing two new concepts that we call “positional deprivation” and “positional inequality”. With positional deprivation we mean the extent to which an individual voter has seen his/her income increase/decrease relatively to others in the same society – for instance how someone in a given decile has experienced income growth that is outstripped by the growth of other deciles in society. With positional inequality we refer to the extent to which an aggregate polity’s richer deciles fare better over a given period of time as compared to the changes in income of its poorer deciles.

We hypothesize that both positional deprivation and positional inequality spur support and voting for radical right parties, and induce voters to favour more anti-globalization, nationalist, and authoritarian positioning among any given party (radical-right or mainstream). The core intuition is that citizens whose own fortunes have regressed compared to others, and those who feel already poor and simultaneously observe income inequalities increase around them, will feel economically deprived and/or be attuned to feelings of economic unfairness. These sentiments will in turn spur support for radical right populist parties and ideas.

The widely debated concept of ‘relative deprivation’ is central to making this link (see Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). Runciman (1966: 10) defines ‘relative deprivation’ as a situation where a person: (i) desires to have X but does not have it; (ii) believes that someone else, or some other people, which may include him/herself at some previous point in time, do have X; and (iii) perceives it as both feasible and just that he/she has X. The psychological mechanism underlying relative deprivation theory is that unsatisfied expectations lead to feelings of frustration which subsequently shape socio-political behavior. Such an idea comports with much longer-standing ideas closer to economics about the positional character of well-being and competition developed in relation to consumption behaviour (Duesenberry 1949; Hirsch 1977; Frank 1985; Ackerman 1997; Sanders 2010; Feltlovich and Ebeju 2014). It is also in line with the empirical finding that general happiness, life satisfaction and perceptions of wellbeing more broadly are as or more strongly influenced
by relative as by absolute material-economic position (Clark and Oswald 1996; Smith et al. 2012).²

Such concerns can affect support for radical right populism through at least two (not necessarily distinct) causal mechanisms. First, people that have seen household incomes grow less strongly, or decrease more significantly, relative to the wealthiest or others in society might be inclined to assign the cause of this unfortunate development to existing/past government policy where radical right populist parties explicitly campaign against, such as: immigration, globalization, and European Union integration. In this way voters may be attracted to radical right populist parties and ideas because they believe that the policies that these parties propose will increase their (relative and/or absolute) economic well-being more significantly as compared to the alternative policies available in the political space. Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie (2000) find, for example, that voting for anti-immigration parties, just like voting for other parties, is largely motivated by pragmatic considerations. The resentment generated by feelings of relative deprivation might also, given that the legitimacy of any political system is at least partly dependent on the (perceived) quality of outputs, cause relatively deprived voters to loose faith in the very principles on which West-European democratic systems rest (democracy, constitutionalism, freedom and human rights). Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier (2001) find in line with this idea that relative deprivation affects the trustworthiness and legitimacy of political institutions.

Second, the combined dynamic and positional misfortune of positional deprivation and relative deprivation may increase support for radical right populism because populist right-wing ideologies provide an easy “scapegoat” for the (alleged) unjust situation relatively deprived voters find themselves in. Much of the existing psychology literature, very much in line with this perspective, has linked relative deprivation with dynamics of intergroup hostility and prejudice (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Runciman, 1966). These studies suggest that the angry resentments generated by relative deprivation will most likely be emotionally directed towards “out-group” members. Which group is perceived to be the relevant “other” is likely to vary across individuals and time but it is nonetheless easily imageable that some of the main issues of radical right populists in current West-European political debates constitute convenient scapegoats for at least some relatively deprived voters. First, immigrants or other “non-natives” constitute perhaps the most concrete group of “others”

² We know of no studies, however, considering the effects of calculations of relative deprivation or position in terms of changes in one’s economic condition – only in terms of static condition.
that could be blamed for relative economic hardship (van Oorschot, 2008). Second, out-group negativity might be directed toward the European Union or other international or supranational institutions given that these institutions exercise power above the national level while political identities are overwhelmingly national, rather than supranational, in nature. Finally, negative feelings about the out-group can for the same reasons express themselves in negativity toward globalization, trade openness, and internationalism more generally (Van der Waal & De Koster, 2017).

4. MEASUREMENT, HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

4.1. Measuring Positional Deprivation and Positional Inequality

Fundamentally we are interested in testing the hypotheses that individuals are more likely to support radical right populist parties and ideas if they have seen their own household income increase (decrease) less (more) than others in the same society, and that (perceived) low income more strongly spurs support for radical right populist parties in polities where the wealthiest have experienced greater gains (smaller losses) than the median or poorest earners. To test the first hypothesis, we would ideally have data for a large number of countries on: (1) attitudes towards radical right populist parties and ideas; (2) data on significant individual-level covariates of such political behaviour; and (3) individual-level data on the percentage change in disposable household income in the preceding (5 or several years) period.

Here we face an important trade-off, however, because there is no data available that systematically contains (1), (2) and (3). True income panel datasets, such as the German Socio-Economic Panel (1984-), the British Household Panel Survey (1991-), Swiss Household Panel (1999-), and the American Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1968-), provide little data on essential political behavioural variables, and in any case do not allow for large cross-country comparisons, while data that does contain cross-country comparable data on political attitudes, such as the European Social Survey and the International Social Survey Programme, only measure the level (not change) of income of an individual respondent on the decile-country-year level.

Preferring a well-specified individual level model and significant scope in terms of countries included in the analysis, we choose to focus on data from the European Social Survey (ESS waves 1-5, 2002-2010), which is the most frequently used data source in studies
towards populism and which’ sampling is considered to be superior to alternative public opinion data (ESS 2016). This, however, forces us to use “anonymous” measures of income change on the country-year-decile level to measure the growth positions of households, for instance deciles, crucial to building measures of positional deprivation and inequality. This means that we are forced to substitute a hypothetical measure of how much a respondents’ income has changed in the past 5 years with how much the income has changed within the decile that the individual respondent belonged to at the end of the preceding 5-year period (as coded in a given wave of ESS). We create variables measuring the decile-country-year change in disposable household income using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), which provides data from large number of representative (cross-sectional) household income surveys held in more than 50 countries from the 1970s onwards. These data have gaps between particular years but can be used to calculate annual or longer-term change in income for a given decile-country-year (LIS 2016).³ To compare varying time-spans, we interpolate linearly the missing values between the roughly five-year intervals of country-specific LIS values.

Note that this strategy is preferable over using true panel data for generating measures of change in income on the decile-country-year level. With true panel data one would follow the same individual i over a particular time period t. In each year one would establish in which decile of the country-year income distribution i is by dividing the panel in 10 groups of 10% of the country-year observations. Based on the average year-to-year change of people that were in a particular decile at t-1 one would estimate the yearly average decile change in household income per country-year. A problem with this is that it is not obvious what to do with people that moved up or down deciles from t-0 to t; should they be considered as representative for the decile that they came from, or representative for the decile that they moved to? Measuring decile-country-year income growth with repeated cross-section data, as we do, can provide the same estimate while avoiding that last problem. In this approach one simply takes two representative (cross-sectional) samples at t and t-1 divides these up into 10 deciles and calculates the percentage change for each decile between these two time points. In addition the (cross-sectional) household surveys included in LIS have much larger sample sizes than available income panel datasets and are at any point in time derived from a fully random sample. This means that the LIS income data is likely to be more reliable than true panel datasets and less sensitive to validity issues due to (non-random) sample attrition.

³ The basis for the present analysis is discussed by Leonhardt and Quealy (2014a, 2014b).
With these anonymous LIS data, in any event, we can devise various measures of \textit{positional deprivation} and \textit{positional inequality}. For both kinds of measures, all our measures focus on deciles in the LIS data. Although one can imagine focusing on group comparisons on a more aggregated (e.g. top 50\% versus the rest) or disaggregated (e.g. top 1\% versus the rest) level in a country-year, we believe the decile level is a reasonable level of analysis to start our explanatory examination of how dynamic-and-positional misfortune affects the tendency of poorer individuals to vote or support radical right populist parties.

To gauge \textit{positional deprivation}, we match the LIS data on growth in disposable household income across deciles to the income-decile of respondents in the ESS database. This is a simple one-to-one matching of the ESS’ individual-level measures of income, registered in the survey instrument in deciles. This provides a further, practical, reason to rely on deciles in our measures of \textit{positional deprivation}. Matching the database on income deciles as our measurement strategy does imply that our results are valid \textit{on average}, to the extent that ESS respondents have not “switched” deciles in the past period. To the extent that such switching has taken place, it can create attenuation bias in estimates using our positional deprivation measures, something we address in our estimation strategies discussed below.\footnote{Note that our empirical approach does, however, reduce statistical power given that their may be significant within-decile differences in income dynamics which are relevant for political preferences but which we average out by design.}

To gauge \textit{positional inequality} (i.e. whether richer groups have seen relatively larger income gains than poor groups in the same aggregate society), our task is simpler. We also rely on the same LIS decile-country-year data, but this time to construct country-year measures.

To illustrate the measures more concretely, Figure 1 estimates a crude ‘growth incidence curve’ for Europe. Figure 1 is based on the un-weighted country averages of 1995 to 2005 growth in household earnings across the ten deciles of the income spectrum of the sixteen European countries included in our sample.\footnote{The countries included are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.} Over this period, averaged across the sample, the richest ten percent of the income distribution experienced the largest real household-income growth, 35\%, while the poorest ten percent also experienced substantial (the second-highest) gain of almost 26\%. The fourth decile, representing as it were the lower middle class, fared on average the worst, with a more modest 21\% growth in disposable household income over the same period. \textit{Positional deprivation} and
*positional inequality* involve a given decile’s change in income *relative to* the change experienced by other deciles. This may entail different time-spans to gauge changes, and also different comparisons of a given decile to another. Deprivation for a particular decile or inequalities across a spectrum can be observed in any given growth incidence curve, including the one reported in Figure 1.

[[Figure 1 about here]]

However, we are interested in distilling systematic measures of *positional deprivation* and *positional inequality* from such curves. *Positional Deprivation* focuses on the level of growth (gains or losses) of a given voter’s own decile relative to the growth of the average, the highest, the lowest, or the median decile. Since growth can entail losses as well as gains for a given period, we are interested in the average-decile change (or the richest, tenth, fifth, or other decile change) minus a respondent’s own decile change. Here, higher values constitute relatively less gain or greater loss for oneself as compared to others in the same society – *positional deprivation*, hence. *Positional Inequality* approximates a dynamic measure of within-country inequality by quantifying the change for a given decile relative to another decile in a given country-year. For instance, one might be interested in the richest ten per cent minus the poorest ten per cent – a dynamic version of an often-used measure of income polarization (e.g. 90-10 income ratios). Higher values, again, constitute higher *positional inequality*.

As can be gleaned from Figure 2, such measures of *positional deprivation* and *positional inequality* can be expected to vary substantially across countries. The Figure shows the growth incidence curves for just a few of the countries underlying Figure 1’s aggregate portrait. The UK is a country where all deciles experienced generally more growth than many other European counterparts, but where the richest decile gained significantly more in household disposable income than the poorest decile did (yielding a story of higher *positional inequality* according to a measure taking the 10th decile minus the bottom decile). Ireland and, particularly, France are examples of the opposite, where the poorest and lower-middle ends of the distribution experience more growth than did the richest decile (scoring low on a 90-10 positional-inequality measure). Finally, Germany (in the lower-right panel of Figure 2) is a strong version of the common U-curve pattern, where both higher and lower
deciles have gained more relative to the middle deciles in a country’s income distribution. A measure to capture such dynamics might look at the top decile minus the fifth. Other variants of positional deprivation or inequality are, of course, conceivable using the LIS data.

The concepts of positional deprivation and positional inequality overlap and bring together familiar measures. For instance, positional deprivation brings an explicitly relational, between-group, dimension to how one’s own income (decile’s) gains compare to that of others. Positional inequality, meanwhile, brings an explicitly dynamic, over-time, dimension to well-known static polarization measures at the country level, such as 90-10 income ratios.

4.2. Measuring support for radical right populism

We measure our outcome of interest (i.e. support for radical right populism) in two distinct ways. First, we create two dichotomous variables that take the value 1 if an individual ESS respondent indicates that he/she feels closest to or has last voted for a radical right populist party, and 0 otherwise. As a robustness test we consider alternatives to such coding (e.g. 1=radical right; 0=mainstream parties). The categorization of radical populist parties is based on widely-used coding, including that by Mudde (2007), March (2011), and Rooduijn et al. (2017). Table 1 provides an overview of the selected parties. The ESS measures of such support and voting for such parties are strongly correlated with one another, and the proportions of the respondents expressing support or having voted for radical-right parties correlates strongly with actual voting for such parties.

Second, we measure support for radical right populism by creating a variable that codes a respondent’s support or vote for a given party in terms of that party’s position-taking on anti-globalization nationalism and authoritarianism, based on data from the Manifesto

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6 The only other party-choice measure in the ESS dataset involves a question about party membership, which captures a much smaller sample of respondents than party affinity or voting.

7 For instance, the share of respondents supporting radical-right parties in the ESS sample period correlates with the actual vote share (ParlGov database, Döring and Manow 2016) in that same period, with an R-square of .88
Project Dataset (MPD) (Budge et.al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Laver and Garry, 2000). The MPD measures party positions on particular issues by the number of sentences (or quasi-sentences) discussing an issue as a percentage of the total number of sentences in a manifesto. While capturing salience of any coded issue to a party, for some issues the MPD separately measures positive and negative statements about policy, whereby scores gauge priorities of support or opposition to particular programs (cf. Klingemann et al. 2006; Mikhaylov et al., 2012). The measurement instrument has been widely used to gauge party positioning, not just with respect to various left-to-right composites but also with respect to issues related to nationalism and anti-globalization (Zurn et al. 2012; Chaudoin et al. 2015; Milner and Judkins 2004).

Given our interest in radical right populism, our main analysis focuses on an encompassing composite of support for and opposition to those measured features of party platforms that gauge anti-globalization nationalism and authoritarianism (net of opposition to these principles) (Burgoon 2009, 2013; Colantone and Stanig 2017). This composite, referred to as Net nationalist autarchy, includes the following issue components from MPD⁸: (1) Protectionism, support for and opposition to trade protectionism (per406 and per407, respectively); (2) Internationalism, support for and opposition to international institutions (per107 and per109, respectively, in the MPD codes); and (3) European Union, support for and opposition to authority of the EU as opposed to national sovereignty (per108 and per110, respectively); (4) Multiculturalism, support for and opposition to multiculturalism and ethnic–linguistic–religious cultural diversity in country (per607 and per608, respectively); (5) National way of life, support for and criticism of patriotism, nationalism and laws to protect established ideas (per601 and per602, respectively); (6) Traditional morality, support for and opposition to traditional values and censorship or other laws to protect established national religion and values (per603 and per604, respectively); (7) Constitutionalism, support for and criticism of accepting constitutional constraints and ‘constitutional way of doing things’ (per203 and per204, respectively); and (8) Democracy and freedom/human rights, support for principles and legal specifics of minority protection and democratic procedure and of individual and political freedoms (per201 and per202, respectively). Based on these platforms, the composite Net nationalist autarchy is:

\[(\text{per}109+\text{per}110+\text{per}406+\text{per}601+\text{per}608+\text{per}603+\text{per}204)-(\text{per}107+\text{per}108+\text{per}407+\text{per}109+\text{per}110+\text{per}406+\text{per}601+\text{per}608+\text{per}603+\text{per}204)\]

⁸ See also Appendix Two for further details.
per602+ per604+ per607+ per201+ per202+ per203). Positive values represent net support for nationalist autarchy and negative values represent net opposition.

As both a theoretical and empirical matter, one can and should consider other specifications of the (combinations of) components of positions on aspects of anti-globalization, nationalism, anti-multiculturalism, anti-constitutionalism, etc. Most important is to consider the exclusion of components that some scholars of radical right populist parties have found to have uneven traction among such parties – such as opposition to constitutionalism or democracy. There is a strong case to be made that radical right parties are often hostile to liberal-democracy and constitutionalism – preferring to champion the masses even if that might mean tyranny of the majority. But in our robustness checks we also consider specifications of net nationalist autarchy that exclude these components.

Figure 3 provides a box-plot overview of net nationalist autarchy for the sixteen party systems in our ESS sample between 2002 and 2012. The boxes demarcate the lower-25th percentile to upper 75th-percentile, show the country-period median, as well as the adjacent values and outliers. As can be seen, the party systems have, on average, negative net nationalist autarchy scores, suggesting that parties tend to eschew rather than embrace such a party programme. But the variation in the party systems is substantial. Importantly for our present analysis, in any event, is that the composite net nationalist autarchy has clear face validity in capturing the degree to which a given party in a given election embraces or eschews the substantive programme of anti-globalization nationalism and authoritarianism associated with radical right parties. In most countries, the parties with the highest net nationalist autarchy are radical right populist parties, as listed in Table 1. The few exceptions are Christian Democratic parties which are sometimes just ahead in their level of net nationalist autarchy as compared to their radical right counterparts. On the other extreme, it’s clear that mainstream left parties, as well as green and liberal parties, tend to be most hostile to this nationalist and populist programme.

[[Figure 3 about here]]

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9 The broader sample summary statistics (see Appendix One) show that net nationalist autarchy among the parties for whom ESS respondents in our 16-country sample voted for averages ~6.6 (the average party platform thus eschewing net nationalist autarchy), with the average level increasing appreciably between 2000 and 2010.

10 This pattern is borne-out by comparing the net nationalist autarchy of traditional party families with radical-right parties. Appendix 3, Figure A3, shows we do not observe a simple U-shaped pattern when moving from left-to-right, through the radical-right family is markedly strongest embracing of net nationalist autarchy.
Based on a party’s *net nationalist autarchy* in a given year, we construe a respondent’s support or vote for that party as partly expressing support for the *net nationalist autarchy* in the party’s platform. Of course, an individual’s support or vote for a party is a complicated matter that may have little to do with the details of a party’s platform, not to mention the particular features of that platform captured by *net nationalist autarchy*. We can do little to control-away the former set of considerations with our existing data. But we can get some purchase on the latter by controlling for other platform components in the MPD data – components that code a party’s positioning but of course separate from the issues central to our conception of radical-right populism. Hence, our models focused on support or voting for parties in terms of the *net nationalist autarchy* in the platforms of such parties control for the MPD left-to-right composite, consisting of a range of items, particularly focused on market-versus-state intervention associated with left-right cleavages. We adjust this control measure by removing from it those few components that also appear in our measure of *net nationalist autarchy* (e.g. issues on constitutionalism). A respondent’s support or vote for a party, hence, is something we construe as support for its platform, including its position on *net nationalist autarchy*, but net of its general left-to-right orientation.

**4.3 Hypotheses**

Based on the theory in section 3 and the operationalization of our right- and left-hand-side variables of interest, as described in subsections 4.1 to 4.3, we now explicitly state our hypotheses.

4.3.1. ‘Positional Deprivation’ Hypotheses

First, *positional deprivation*, that is being in a decile that has done more poorly *relative* to other deciles in an individual’s own country and year, can be expected to foster a sense of deprivation and resentment which in turn may lead to more support for radical right populism. Such a dynamic might hold up for any baseline decile or average of deciles relative to one’s own, and the most general expectation is thus that individuals whose decile’s growth in real income has been outpaced by the country-year average of income growth ought to be more likely to embrace radical right populism. Yet, one can also imagine that resentment and subjective deprivation will be stronger with respect to particular points in the income distribution, for example the extremes of that distribution. For instance, individuals whose
decile has experienced more modest gains than the wealthiest decile’s gains can be expected to feel a sense of relative deprivation to the most fortunate in society that plays into the basic anti-system and anti-elite pitch of radical right parties. One might also expect, however, that belonging to a decile that has experienced lower gains than the poorest ten per cent might also provoke a distinct level of resentment – that one’s political economy is functioning in a way that favors the poorest and least active members of the population than it does for the middle class or the ‘common man’. Recall that it is a truism of political economy that a much higher proportion of citizens of industrialized economies categorize themselves as “middle class” and “middle income” than is statistically true (Evans and Kelley 2004). All parties exploit this but radical right parties do so particularly slavishly. For instance, Geert Wilders’s Dutch Party of Freedom (PVV) has long championed the interests of the iconic ‘Henk and Ingrid’ (old-fashioned Dutch names), who are ‘hard-working Dutchman or Dutchwoman’ agrieved by both ends of the class spectrum, elites and welfare cheats (often referred to as ‘welfare kings and queens’ with a non-Western immigrant background).

We test two versions of our ‘Positional Deprivation’ Hypothesis. The first one focuses on support for the particular category of ‘radical right populist’ parties. This is the categorical approach, advocated by (among others) Mair and Mudde (1998) in their study of party families. Here, parties can be grouped in ideological families, such as the liberal family, the social-democratic family, or the radical right family on the basis of their ideology. Since radical right populism is an ideological category, albeit a broad one, this binary approach has long dominated study of radical right populism, where a given party can be classified as either being radical right populist or not (e.g. Van Kessel, 2015). Following this tradition, our first ‘Positional Deprivation’ Hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 1a:
*Individuals in deciles experiencing lower gains than the gains of the average, the highest, or the lowest deciles of the country’s income spectrum are more likely to vote for radical right parties than are individuals whose decile has outpaced the gains of other deciles.*

*Positional deprivation* can be expected, however, to have implications not only for support given to parties with a particular ‘radical right’ imprimatur, but also to any and all parties embracing policy positions manifesting radical right populist ideas (Spanje 2010; Rooduijn et al. 2014; Colantone and Stanig 2017). According to an extensive literature on the substance of populist backlash, right-wing populism champions anti-globalization nationalism
(including anti-migrant or anti-multiculturalism and in the European context anti-EU integration) and anti-liberal authoritarianism (including skepticism towards constitutional protections of human rights and minority rights) (Mudde 2007; Hooghe et al. 2002; Ivarsflaten 2008; Rooduijn et al. 2014; Inglehart and Norris 2016). Following this reasoning, our second ‘Positional Deprivation’ Hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 1b: Individuals in deciles experiencing lower gains than the gains of the average, the highest, or the lowest deciles of the country’s income spectrum are more likely to vote for parties whose platforms are more anti-globalization nationalist and authoritarian than are individuals whose decile has outpaced the gains of other deciles.

We expect both versions of the ‘Positional Deprivation’ hypothesis to hold regardless of the particular comparison-decile(s) or period of time taken to judge such dynamic inequality. Also, it might be that one’s decile’s gains relative to the poorest decile is particularly important in shaping support for radical right parties – as these parties are particularly focused on the ‘common man’ relative to deadbeats and welfare cheats who can be expected to cluster in the lowest decile (Swank and Betz 2003; Hoggett et al. 2013). But we shall treat such more nuanced variants of Hypotheses 1a and 1b as empirical questions.

4.3.2. Positional Inequality Hypotheses

Second, we expect aggregate-level positional inequality measured at the country-year level to have distinct implications for radical-right populism. In a given country-year, the gap in gains experienced by the richest relative to the poorest deciles, or the richest relative to the middle-deciles, might directly if diffusely foster feelings of unfairness and resentment in a country. This is partly a socio-tropic effect, where a polity’s positional inequality plays into despair for all one’s countrymen and women that the economic elite are getting ever more, not just already having more, than the less-well-off masses. But we believe that such country-year aggregate relative or positional prosperity can particularly be expected to alter the way individual-level economic position plays out. This would involve an interaction effect between positional inequality and individual-level economic wellbeing or suffering. Individuals who feel economically poor might generally be more inclined to turn to more radical parties offering-up big solutions outside of the usual party fold. But this judgment
will be emboldened, partly egoistically and partly socio-tropically, to the extent that the deprivation is shared and general for the aggrieved group. Such logic is captured by Donald Trump’s plaintive ‘what do you have to lose?’, that exploits the economic desperation of the many to activate politically one’s own latent individual suffering. By such reckoning, positional inequality should, beyond static inequality, deepen the tendency of individual poverty to spur populist revolt.

One can imagine any given reckoning of country-year positional inequality, but we are particularly interested in the effect of the gap in income growth rates between the richer and poorer deciles. For the ‘Positional Inequality’ hypotheses we again distinguish between a version focused on the simple party-family categorisation and a version focused on substantive party platforms. The party-family formulation is:

Hypothesis 2a:  
*The tendency of poorer, economically less well-off, individuals to support radical right parties ought to be significantly enhanced to the extent that the richer deciles have tended to fare better than the middle or poorer deciles in their country.*

Swinging free of this expectation is the formulation of the ‘Positional Inequality’ hypothesis related to the substantive positioning or party platforms of all parties, not just the binary choice of the ‘radical right’ party-family:

Hypothesis 2b:  
*The extent to which poorer, economically less well-off, individuals to support parties whose platforms are anti-globalization nationalist and authoritarian ought to be significantly enhanced to the extent that the richer deciles have tended to fare better than the middle or poorer deciles in their country.*

Both versions of the ‘Positional Inequality’ hypothesis ought to hold for any given period of time within which to gauge the national-level gap in gains across deciles.

### 4.4 Empirical strategy

For our tests of Hypothesis 1a, where our dependent variable is binary, the baseline models are logistic regression models with country and time (i.e. ESS wave) fixed effects.¹¹

¹¹ Note that all models that we report include ESS’s design and population weights. The LIS data is also generated using the provided (country-year) survey weights. We include all ESS waves for our 16 European countries between 2002 and 2010 in our analysis.
In these models, we include only those country-years in which one or more radical right parties participated (hence exclusion of Spain and Ireland). In particular we estimate the following equation:

\[
\ln \left( \frac{p_{it}}{1-p_{it}} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{it} + \beta_2 \delta_t + \beta_3 C_i + \beta_4 T_t + \epsilon_{it}
\]

Where \(\ln \left( \frac{p_{it}}{1-p_{it}} \right)\) is the odds that individual respondent \(i\) has voted or feels closest to a radical right populist party in ESS wave \(t\).\(^{12}\) \(X\) is one of our measures of *positional deprivation* related to respondent \(i\) in ESS wave \(t\). In our baseline models we measure positional deprivation by the change in real household income of the highest, lowest, or average decile of respondent \(i\)’s country minus the income decile change of respondent \(i\) him/herself over the previous 5-year period. \(\delta_t\) is a set of individual-level control variables. As controls, we consider a range of socio-demographic, economic and attitudinal variables. We control for education by including a respondent’s highest level of completed *education*. We distinguish 5 categories: (1) less than lower secondary education; (2) lower secondary education completed; (3) upper secondary education completed; (4) post-secondary non-tertiary education completed; and (5) tertiary education completed. We also consider whether respondents are *unemployed* (1 = unemployed); their *age*, their female *sex* (1 = female); their subjective *religiosity* (11-point scale: 0 = not at all religious, 10 = very religious); their or their parents’ *foreign born* status (0=native born self and parents; 1=foreign born self or parent); the *urban* living status of the respondent (rural = 0, urban = 1); and a respondent’s general left-to-right self-identification (left=0; right=1). \(C\) in equation (1) is a country fixed effect, and \(T\) is a fixed effect for ESS wave, while \(\epsilon_{ij}\) is the overall error-term of the model. To account for autocorrelation, we cluster the standard errors on the country-decile level. We report all results as log odds, where we expect \(\beta_1\) to be substantially and statistically significantly positive, suggesting that individuals that have seen their own household income increase less rapidly (or decrease more) than other deciles in their own society are more likely to support or have voted for radical right populist parties.

With our second dependent variable, the *net nationalist autarchy* of a party, we go beyond the simple radical right populist/other party dichotomy and establish to what extent

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\(^{12}\) More specifically the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if a respondent indicates that he/she has last voted for or currently feels closest to a radical right populist party, and 0 otherwise (i.e. all other parties are included in the 0 category).
positional deprivation induces respondents to feel more affinity to parties that take policy positions that are more in line with right-wing populist ideas. To test this expectation we estimate fixed effects ordinary least squares regression models of the following form:

\[
Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{it} + \beta_2 \delta_{it} + \beta_3 C_{it} + \beta_4 T_i + \epsilon_{it}
\]

Where \(Y_{it}\) are our measures of a supported or voted-for party’s net nationalist autarchy, related to respondent \(i\), at time \(t\). The controls are the same as in equation (1), except that we now include a party’s manifesto-based left-to-right orientation as a control variable in \(\delta\). This is necessary to see whether a respondent’s choice for a political party is influenced by its level of nationalist autarchy, net of other party-platform positions relevant to left-right positioning. Here we use Eicker–Huber–White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, which, as in equation (1), are clustered on the country-decile level.

To examine the hypothesis that subjective economic wellbeing more strongly spurs support for radical right populist parties in polities with higher ‘positional inequality’, where the wealthiest deciles experience greater gains than (or suffer less than) the median or poorest earners (i.e. Hypotheses 2a and 2b), we simply substitute \(X\) in equations (1) and (2) with the difference in income growth between the 10\(^{th}\) versus the 5\(^{th}\), the 10\(^{th}\) versus the 1\(^{st}\), or the 5\(^{th}\) versus the 1\(^{st}\) decile in respondent \(i\)’s country, interacted with the subjective economic wellbeing of \(i\).\(^{13}\) Here we cluster the standard errors on the country-year level.

We foresee potential sources of bias in our estimates of the effect of positional deprivation and positional inequality. Our results may be biased due to confounding (i.e. unobserved variables that cause both positional deprivation and voting/issue preferences). This, of course, is the most important motivation for considering fixed-effects for country and time as our baseline models. On theoretical grounds, however, we also believe that such omitted variable bias is unlikely given that 5-year relative income dynamics and individual voting/issue preferences are unlikely to share much determinants in common.\(^{14}\) As we discussed above, our estimates could also be biased by our data’s proxying of individual-level

\(^{13}\) The subjective income/wellbeing variable is based on a survey questions asking respondents how they ‘feel about their household income nowadays’ on a scale ranging from ‘finding it very difficult on present income’ (1) to ‘living comfortably on present income’ (4). We employ this variable since person A might experience a certain income as low, while person B can cope rather well with this same amount of money.

\(^{14}\) Note that reverse causality is unlikely to be a source of endogeneity in our estimation since a respondent’s voting/issue preferences of individuals can hardly be expected to cause 5-year relative income dynamics across income deciles.
income dynamics with the income dynamic of the respondents’ decile group, which we assume (s)he was in during the previous 5-year period (based on the decile (s)he is coded in at the end of the 5-year period). Our measures of positional deprivation ($X_i$) might introduce some measurement error to the extent that there is significant within-decile differences in income dynamics relevant to political preferences, but which we average out by design; and to the extent that we miscode individuals that have moved into another decile over the previous 5-year period. If this measurement error is random, regression coefficients will be biased downwards due to attenuation bias. If not, the error could affect the validity of our estimates. We address this issue by a robustness check whereby we include the dynamics of the decile above and below (separately) together with the income decile that a respondent is coded in. This should alleviate this concern, given that individuals are unlikely to move up or down more than one decile within 5 years. To adjust for the autocorrelation generated by (i) we cluster the standard errors in our estimates. In addition to these baseline models, in any event, we consider and discuss a range of alternative specifications, including alternative measures of positional deprivation and positional inequality, alternative controls, and alternative estimators.

5. FINDINGS

We present the results of our analysis by taking our two broad specifications of voter support for radical-right populism in turn. The first set of results focuses on Hypotheses 1a and 2a on how positional deprivation and positional inequality are associated with the probability that an individual ESS respondent feels most closest to or has most recently voted for a radical right populist party. The second set of results focuses on Hypotheses 1b and 2b, where we explore how our positional measures shape a respondents support and voting for a party’s net nationalist autarchy.

5.1. SUPPORT AND VOTING FOR RADICAL RIGHT PARTY FAMILY

Table 2 shows the results for how Positional Deprivation influences both support and voting for radical right populist parties, providing diverse tests of Hypothesis 1a. The first three models (M1-M3) focus on the results for the party to which respondents feel closest, while the latter three models (M4-M6) focus on actual past voting. The various controls perform in
line with earlier exploration of radical right populism. For instance and most importantly, radical right respondents are more likely to be male, subjectively poorer, less educated, younger, and more than mainstream party supporters/voters self-report to be more right-wing.

As for the main results, all models (M1-M6) suggest that *Positional Deprivation* significantly correlates with a higher propensity to support or vote radical right. As Model 1 shows, respondents in deciles whose five-year gains in real household income are more substantially outpaced by the average gains of all deciles in the income spectrum are statistically significantly more likely to support or vote radical populist. A similar pattern emerges with respect to the more decile-specific benchmarks in *positional deprivation*, such as one’s own change relative to the richest decile (M2 and M5) or one’s own change relative to the poorest decile (M3 and M6). Importantly, the results hold for not only the party to which respondents feel closest to but also for the party for which they last voted – with the role of *Positional Deprivation* being substantively and statistically stronger for the voting measure than for the party-proximity measure. Altogether, this is a pattern clearly in support of Hypothesis 1a.

[[Table 2 about here]]

Figure 4 provides a snapshot of the substantive size of these effects using M1 and M3 (i.e. the degree to which a country’s average five-year household income decile growth outstrips that of a respondent’s decile). On the vertical axis, both panels capture the predicted probability of supporting or voting for radical-right parties across the full (sub-)sample distribution of *Positional Deprivation*, holding all other parameters at their means or medians. The vertical reference lines denote the 1st, 50th and 99th range of the dispersed distribution. The effects are substantively modest, though more substantial given the relative rarity of supporting radical populist parties in these European party systems (with average chance of supporting such parties under 5 percent, and average chance of voting for one under 4 percent). The full sample variation in average change in disposable income minus one’s own decile gains predicts about a five percentage-point increase in the chance of supporting radical populist parties. Of course, the effects are more modest still if one focuses on the kind of variation a given individual is likely to experience over the period, such between the 1st and the 50th percentile in decile change relative to average change. This substantive effect is greater than for subjective income/wellbeing, though substantially smaller than the effect of
education in our models. Yet, the support for Hypothesis 1a is consistent and substantial in either case.

[[Figure 4 about here]]

Table 3 summarizes the results for how Positional Inequality influences support and voting for the radical-right party family. Here, we are interested in testing Hypothesis 2a by considering whether and how measures of Positional Inequality exacerbate the generally strong and statistically-significant effect of subjective income on support and voting for radical right populist parties. Hypothesis 2a predicts that the significant negative effect of income should be made more negative, be enhanced, to the extent that respondents are in settings with high Positional Inequality. Support for hypothesis 2 would be manifest in a negative and significant interaction term. To conserve space, we do not reproduce the full results for the controls, even though the models include the same controls (including fixed effects) as in Table 2.

[[Table 3 about here]]

The results (M7-M12) concern the three measures of Positional Inequality – that focus on full-register (M7 and M10), upper-register (M8 and M11), and lower-register positional inequality (M9 and M12), respectively. The conditional effect of income, counterfactually capturing the effect of subjective wealth-wellbeing where this measure of Positional Inequality is at zero (roughly the 20th percentile of this parameter’s sample distribution), is still highly significant and negative. Hence, even at relatively low levels of Positional Inequality, so measured, we see in all the models that particularly subjectively lower-income respondents are most likely to support and vote for radical right parties. Most important for Hypothesis 2a, however, is that the interaction term tends to be negative and statistically significant for all but the upper-register measure of Positional Inequality (M8 and M11), the interaction term for which is just under standard levels of statistical significance. Hence, the already negative tendency of radical right support or voting to be decreasing in subjective income tends to be enhanced to the extent that respondents live and work in country-year settings with higher full-register and lower-register Positional Inequality. To see these
patterns more clearly, however, requires some counterfactual modeling with respect to quantities of interest.

Figure 5 provides a snapshot of such modeling. It shows how full-register *Positional Inequality* alters negatively the marginal effect of *Subjective wealth-wellbeing* (or subjective income) on support for radical right party families, based on the results for support (left-hand panel, based on Models M7) and for voting (right-hand panel, based on M10). Where the mean values and their upper-and-lower confidence intervals are all below zero, we see a pattern where subjective income statistically significantly reduces the propensity to support radical-right parties. And where any of these schedules is above zero, the model counterfactually suggests that such subjective wellbeing is no longer a statistically-significant force for reducing radical right populism. The steepness of the negative slope of these schedules capture the extent of the hypothesized conditioning effect. And to give an extra sense of that size and strength, the Figure plots the position on the full-register *Positional Inequality* at which *subjective income/wellbeing* is significant in reducing support for radical populism (see dashed vertical line for each panel). As we can see, the exacerbating effect is strong enough to imply that *subjective wealth-wellbeing* does not significantly predict radical right support when full-register *position inequality* (10th decile growth minus 1st decile growth) is lower than about the 18th percentile of the sample distribution. And the tipping point is somewhat higher, at 21st percentile of the distribution, in our model focused on voting. Either way, it is clear that we have some support for Hypothesis 2a – albeit mixed in that this does not extend across all our measures of positional inequality.

[[Figure 5 about here]]

5.2. SUPPORT AND VOTING FOR *NET NATIONALIST AUTARCHY*

We now turn to whether these patterns hold for a very different specification focused on the substance of party positioning rather than simple identity in the radical right party family. Before turning to the principal results testing Hypotheses 1b and 2b, we briefly note the empirical relationship between the two specifications – between support or voting for the ‘radical right party’ as a party family on the one hand, and the support or voting for a party’s *net nationalist autarchy* on the other. We saw from Figure 5 (and party-family Appendix
Three) that parties in the radical-right family tended to be the most embracing of net nationalist autarchy. Here we can add that this is true if one looks more closely in a regression context at the relationship, following our model specification (equation (2) above) focused on estimating a respondent’s support or vote for a given party weighted by net nationalist autarchy. But we can then focus on how such a respondent’s positioning might be a function of that same respondent’s support or vote for the ‘radical right populist’ party family (our dependent variable in Tables 2 and 3 above) – net of the full battery of individual and country-level controls. Appendix Three shows the full results, focused on support for a given party’s net nationalist autarchy, and on voting for a party’s given net nationalist autarchy. The models consider, furthermore, whether support for the radical right party family is significant without or with addition of control for their chosen party’s left-to-right manifesto score (adjusted, again, to exclude the components of net nationalist autarchy). The key finding is that those supporting or voting for parties in the radical-right populist family are also more likely to support or vote for parties that most embrace net nationalist autarchy – even after controlling for the left-to-right features of their chosen party’s party platform.\textsuperscript{15}

We take this as preliminary and rough evidence that the two conceptualisations (support for the radical right family and for a party’s net nationalist autarchy) are, indeed, capturing citizen support for isomorphic radical right party stances.

Table 4 shows the results focused on our test of Hypothesis 1a, that positional deprivation ought to spur support or voting for parties embracing net nationalist autarchy, net of their chosen party’s general left-to-right platform orientation. The controls suggest that those supporting or voting for parties that most embrace net nationalist autarchy tend to be less educated and male and generally right-wing. In contrast to the results with respect to support or voting for the radical right party family, we see that voting for parties with high net nationalist autarchy is increasing in rural, religious and older respondents.

\textsuperscript{15} See Appendix Table A3. Interestingly, the coefficients and significance for ‘radical-right populist’ party identification in these specifications are associated more strongly with our baseline composite of net nationalist autarchy more so than the variant that excludes anti-liberal democracy components.
net nationalist autarchy, net of the party’s position on left-to-right positioning. The results are, however, less consistent than the binary party-family results. The basic size and significance is positive, in line with Hypothesis 1b, when one focuses on mean or median decile growth minus respondent’s own growth, but not for 1st-decile growth minus respondent’s growth (M15), though in models focused on parties for which respondents voted the coefficients are significant at the 10% level of significance (M18).

To get a rough sense of the substantive size of these results, Figure 6 provides a snapshot of the increase in the predicted net nationalist autarchy of a respondent’s supported or voted-for party as a function of increasing positional deprivation. The results are based on M13 and M16, focused on how one’s positional deprivation relative to the average-change in household income spurs both support (left-hand panel) and voting (right-hand panel) for a party’s net nationalist autarchy. The vertical axis shows this time predicted values of net nationalist autarchy. The modeled effects of positional deprivation are close to the results regarding support for the radical right populist party family. From Figure 6 we can see, for instance, that the full range of positional deprivation predicts an increase from roughly an -8.5 score on the composite to a score of -6.2 – constituting roughly 20 percent of the sample distribution of net nationalist autarchy (a predicted increase from the 30th to the 50th percentile of such positioning). These effects may appear modest, but they are again in substantive terms comparable to the subjective income/wellbeing parameter and much more significant than unemployment. Education, on the other hand, remains the strongest socio-economic status predictor in terms of both statistical and substantive significance. The patterns suggest, in any event, clear support for Hypothesis 1b.

Finally, Table 5 summarises the results testing Hypothesis 2b, focused on whether and how positional inequality might exacerbate the extent to which subjective income increases support or voting for parties with higher net nationalist autarchy in their platforms. We show only the main results to conserve space but in all cases include the same controls as in Table 4. The main results involve the components and interaction between national-year level positional inequality on the one hand, and support and voting for parties embracing more or less net nationalist autarchy on the other. Here we see more mixed results for our expectations. With respect to the specifications focused on support for parties (M19-M21),
none of the interactions meet standard levels of statistical significance. However, with respect to the specifications focused on voting for parties (M22-M24), all three specifications do meet the .05 significance standard. For the results achieving significance, the pattern echoes the results reported in Table 3. That is, respondents with lower subjective income tend to vote for parties embracing net nationalist autarchy, net of those parties’ left-to-right orientations, and they tend to do so more significantly and strongly when positional inequality is greater. Importantly, however, this exacerbating role of positional inequality does not extent to the net nationalist autarchy of the party to which respondents feel closest.

[[Table 5 about here]]

A final Figure 7 clarifies the predicted interaction, focusing again on estimating the counterfactual marginal effects for both support and voting for parties’ scores, conditional upon full-range positional inequality (M19 and M22, hence). With respect to support for net nationalist autarchy (the left-hand panel based on M19), subjective income is significantly negative throughout the range of positional inequality. Poorer respondents are more likely to embrace such platforms, hence, regardless of their country’s level of positional inequality. However, with respect to actual voting for parties, positional inequality strongly alters subjective income’s implications for votes to parties with higher net nationalist autarchy (right-hand panel, based on M22). Subjective income/wellbeing significantly reduces voting for Net nationalist autarchy only in settings with substantial aggregate positional inequality, beyond the 37th percentile of the distribution of the latter. We interpret the results as only weak support for Hypothesis 2b – only holding for platforms of parties voted for, not platforms of parties to which respondents feel closest.

[[Figure 7 about here]]

We interpret the results in Tables 2 through 5 as suggesting that Positional Deprivation and Positional Inequality likely undergird support and voting for radical right populism. The main qualification is that Positional Inequality appears to be a less consistent factor in altering the effect of levels of household income on platforms associated with radical-right populist ideas. This qualification in mind, the evidence so far may help make sense of stories of resentment and relative deprivation to have loomed large in qualitative and
journalistic accounts of the movements behind radical right parties in a range of Western political economies. Testing this possibility more directly, however, is beyond the ESS dataset, which lacks the kinds of survey questions and parameters to allow a focused exploration of whether economic resentments play an mediating role linking radical-right populist support to positional deprivation or positional inequality. Such tests would require questions about actual subjective economic position relative to others and/or about possible dissatisfaction or disgruntlement with their own and others’ treatment by the government. The closest the ESS comes to such parameters are questions about satisfaction generally with the government or economy. For what it’s worth, our positional measures significantly spur dissatisfaction and distrust, which in turn significantly spur radical-right voting. And taking these as extra control variables tends to modestly lower the size and significance of the explanatory power of both Positional deprivation and Positional inequality in shaping radical populism (as in Tables 2-5). More meaningful mediation analysis, however, must be left to better measures and further study.

Within the possibilities afforded by the ESS dataset, it is worth pointing out that the effects summarized in Tables 2-5 do not get significantly or consistently altered by any of the individual parameters on which we focus as controls. For instance, the tendency of positional deprivation to spur support and voting for radical right parties and their net nationalist autarchy does not get significantly altered by gender, age, unemployment, subjective income, urban residence, religiosity or right self-identification. The one, and interesting, exception involves being foreign born or having parents who are foreign born: Positional deprivation (and, for that matter, positional inequality) spurs support and voting for radical-right parties only among natives and those whose parents are also natives. While this may have a variety of explanations, an obvious one is that the economic anxieties associated with the positional misfortunes on which we focus might be trumped by the more cultural considerations that might preoccupy foreign-born voters in their political thinking about political party choices.

The main results in Table 2 through 5 – support for the Positional Deprivation Hypotheses and mixed support for the Positional Inequality Hypotheses – are stable in the face of many alternative specifications. Space constraints extensive discussion of the alternatives, but the most important tests can be briefly summarized. First, alternative specifications of our left-hand-side and right-hand-side measures do not significantly alter our portrait. The significance and direction of the baseline results hold for alternative measures of

16 Results not shown but available upon request.
“radical right” party families and to net-nationalist-autarchy in party platforms. With respect to the party-family specification, this includes removing any particular “radical” party from the coding. And it includes coding as “radical right” key parties that have recently turned to radical populism, particularly Poland’s Law and Justice Party. The results also hold for specifications of radical-right support or voting relative to support or voting for mainstream parties – excluding, hence, marginal parties like radical-left parties. And with respect to our party-manifesto measure, the results also hold for alternative specifications of the platform measure of net nationalist autarchy – for instance, to measures excluding from the baseline composite the components of anti-democracy, anti-constitutionalism and/or anti-human-rights protections. The results also hold for alternative specifications of our right-hand-side measures of Positional Deprivation and Positional Inequality, for instance to taking other deciles or combinations of deciles from which to measure difference, or taking other stretches of years (other than the five-year basis for the baseline). Relevant to the high-dispersal of the positional measures, the results also hold to removing extreme-low and extreme-high (e.g. <1st and >99th percentile) outliers in positional deprivation or inequality from the sample.

Second, the baseline patterns hold to additional, fewer or different combinations of controls. The results hold for inclusion of additional individual-economic controls, like working hours or past unemployment. They also hold to other demographic controls like regions or measures of family composition; and to further attitudinal controls (e.g. attitudes towards immigration, attitude towards government redistribution, and work satisfaction). While our baseline models use fixed effects for countries and time (survey rounds) and therefore absorb any biasing role of country-year factors, random-intercept modelling also allows more extended control and exploration of such factors. This is relevant to clarifying that positional deprivation and positional inequality has implications for radical-right populism net of well-known economic conditions like levels or changes in aggregate unemployment rates, GDP per capita, or Gini-index inequality. Controlling explicitly for these in random effects models reveals that our positional deprivation and positional inequality conditions tend to have the hypothesized effects in spurring radical-right populism net of, and indeed more consistently and strongly than, these other aggregate economic conditions. This highlights what we see as distinctive about positional deprivation and positional inequality – that they combine dynamic with positional features of economic misfortune plausibly relevant to radical-right populism. In any event, in random intercept models, the results also hold to inclusion of other macro-level controls like electoral
institutions (e.g. proportional representation, democracy, federalism, net migration rates, foreign born stocks).

Third and finally, the baseline patterns hold up to alternative estimators. The most important include random intercept and random slope models, or simple logit or probit models without fixed effects. They also hold to alternative standard errors calculations, such as alternative clustering (e.g. country-decile-year) or bootstrapping. And the results for radical-right party choice also hold for multinomial-logit estimation, taking mainstream parties as the baseline and then radical-right, radical-left, and non-voting as alternatives (and for specifications on feeling closest to radical parties, taking “not feeling closest to any party” as a comparable category of political withdrawal). Altogether, these robustness and sensitivity tests suggests that the baseline results in Tables 2 through 5 capture more than a selective cut at the opinion data.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to clarify how radical-right populism might be importantly influenced by positional deprivation, how much a person’s growth in disposable household income is outpaced by that of others in his or her country, and positional inequality, the extent to which a country has its wealthier citizens experience more growth in disposable household income than do poorer citizens. The paper sought to show that these conceptions, by directly highlighting the combination of over-time (dynamic) and between-group (positional) economic misfortune, can be expected to spur support and voting for parties associated with anti-system, anti-elite and nationalist radical-right populism. The empirical inquiry suggests that positional deprivation tends to directly spur, net of other economic and political features, support and voting for radical right parties and also parties embracing net nationalist autarchy. The evidence is less consistent for the possibility that the aggregate measure of positional inequality might indirectly spur radical-right populism, by enhancing the tendency of poorer respondents to vote for parties associated radical-right populism.

Important qualifications apply to these argument and conclusion. Limits in the public-opinion data analyzed here have made it difficult to directly explore the mechanisms putatively at work in the patterns reported above. We don’t know whether the positional

17 The results of such multinomial models reveal that positional deprivation spurs the probability of political withdrawal, particularly non-voting and of not feeling close to any party.
deprivation and inequality measures really shape resentments, and we certainly don’t know enough to disentangle the results from cultural resentments. A second qualification involves the cross-section-time series basis of the positional measures. While relevant, these are less evocative than ‘non-anonymous’, true-panel information that might capture more valid, if by necessity more short-term, measures of positional deprivation and inequality. Third, the analysis is based on available data for cross-section of years capturing broad differences in European political economic and electoral experience, but the conclusions may not extend to longer time periods or other countries, such as outside the European context. For all these reasons, we offer the paper’s arguments and evidence on the links between radical right populism and positional deprivation and inequality as suggestive.

But what they suggest is important to understanding how economic experience shapes the political ferment of radical-right populism. Positional deprivation and inequalities may well have implications that go above and beyond the role of well-known economic forces. Scholarly and popular commentary has often dismissed economic forces as less important than cultural experiences to shaping the palpable resentments at play in radical-populist politics. Making such judgment, however, is premature, not just due to the need for nuanced research designs to disentangle cultural from economic experiences, but also for the more prosaic reason that we need to measure the basics of economic experience to capture the distinctive combination of dynamic and positional economic misfortune associated with populist ferment. Positional deprivation and inequality may help capture such misfortune. And if the patterns discussed above hold, then we know better the economic conditions that are afoot and can better learn which economic interventions can hope to solve one of the most important challenges of contemporary Western politics.

References


Han, K.J. (2016). Income inequality and voting for radical right-wing parties. *Electoral Studies*, 42(1), 54-64.


Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Wilson, C. J. (2002). Does left/right structure party positions on European integration? *Comparative Political Studies, 35*(8), 965–989.


Rooduijn, M., & Burgoon, B. M. (2017). The paradox of wellbeing: Do unfavorable socioeconomic and sociocultural contexts deepen or dampen radical left and right voting among the less well-off? Comparative Political Studies.


Table 1.
Radical right Populist parties in Fourteen European Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Radical right party</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Radical right party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Austria   | Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Alliance for the Future  | Italy     | Northern League (LN)  
|           | of Austria (BZÖ)                                         |           | National Alliance (AN)                                    |
|           |                                                          |           | Tricolor Flame (FT)                                       |
| Belgium   | Flemish Interest (VB), National Front Belgium (FNb)      | Netherlands | List Pim Frotuy (LPF)  
|           |                                                          |           | Party of Freedom (PVV)                                    |
| Denmark   | Danish People’s Party (DF)                               | Norway    | Progress Party (FrP)                                      |
|           |                                                          |           |                                                          |
| Finland   | Finns Party/True Fins (PS)                               | Poland    | League of Polish Families (LPR)                           |
|           | National Front (FN)                                      |           | Congress of the New Right (KNP)                           |
| France    | National Republican Movement (MNR)                       | Sweden    | Sweden Democrats (SD)                                     |
| Germany   | The Republicans (REP)                                    | Switzerland | Swiss People’s Party (SVP)/UDC   
|           | National Democratic Party (NPD)                          |           | Freedom Party (FrP)                                       |
|           |                                                          |           | Ticino League (LtT)                                       |
| Greece    | Popular Orthodox Party (LAOS)                            | United Kingdom | British National Party (BNP)                           
|           | Gold.Dawn                                                |           | UK Independence Party (UKIP)                              |

Source: Mudde 2007; March and Mudde 2005; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
Table 2: Positional Deprivation and Support or Vote for Radical Populist Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M3</th>
<th>M4</th>
<th>M5</th>
<th>M6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feel closest to Radical Right party</td>
<td>Voted for Radical Right party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positional Deprivation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean decile growth minus respondent's growth</td>
<td>0.026* (0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th decile growth minus respondent's growth</td>
<td>0.030* (0.012)</td>
<td>0.029*** (0.010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st decile growth minus respondent's growth</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.029*** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.039** (0.015)</td>
<td>0.043** (0.015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective income/wellbeing</td>
<td>-0.275*** (0.066)</td>
<td>-0.275*** (0.066)</td>
<td>-0.265*** (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.144** (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.145** (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.141** (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.190*** (0.038)</td>
<td>-0.190*** (0.037)</td>
<td>-0.202*** (0.041)</td>
<td>-0.216*** (0.041)</td>
<td>-0.216*** (0.041)</td>
<td>-0.223*** (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.519+ (0.268)</td>
<td>0.520+ (0.270)</td>
<td>0.522+ (0.215)</td>
<td>0.143 (0.214)</td>
<td>0.145 (0.214)</td>
<td>0.175 (0.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.011*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.011*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.012*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.010*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.010*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.010*** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.540*** (0.089)</td>
<td>-0.551*** (0.090)</td>
<td>-0.542*** (0.111)</td>
<td>-0.368*** (0.111)</td>
<td>-0.360*** (0.111)</td>
<td>-0.361*** (0.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign born</td>
<td>-0.431* (0.189)</td>
<td>-0.432* (0.189)</td>
<td>-0.430* (0.155)</td>
<td>-0.184 (0.155)</td>
<td>-0.184 (0.155)</td>
<td>-0.186 (0.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.048* (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.048* (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.049* (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.064*** (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.064*** (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.066*** (0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.025 (0.093)</td>
<td>0.026 (0.094)</td>
<td>0.020 (0.086)</td>
<td>0.084 (0.085)</td>
<td>0.085 (0.085)</td>
<td>0.071 (0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right self-placement</td>
<td>2.266*** (0.301)</td>
<td>2.269*** (0.301)</td>
<td>2.276*** (0.299)</td>
<td>1.786*** (0.299)</td>
<td>1.788*** (0.299)</td>
<td>1.812*** (0.299)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.353*** (0.434)</td>
<td>-2.304*** (0.433)</td>
<td>-2.489*** (0.412)</td>
<td>-2.693*** (0.464)</td>
<td>-2.622*** (0.463)</td>
<td>-2.913*** (0.430)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country dummies</td>
<td>Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS-round dummies</td>
<td>Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R-square</td>
<td>0.22 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.19</td>
<td>29,930 29,930 29,930 44,960 44,960 44,960</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DV for models M1-M3: Feel closest to Radical Right Party.
DV for models M4-M6: Voted for Radical Right Party.
All models (M1-M6) logistic regression with fixed effects for countries and years (survey rounds) (not shown), and with standard errors clustered by country-decile (in parentheses).

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 3:  
*Positional Inequality* and Support or Vote for Radical Populist Parties

![Table 3: Positional Inequality and Support or Vote for Radical Populist Parties](image)

DV for models M7-M9: *Feel closest to Radical Right party.*  
DV for models M10-M12: *Voted for Radical Right party.*  
All models (M7-M12): Logit coefficients with standard errors clustered by country-decile (in parentheses), with country and survey-round fixed effects. Same controls, coverage and specification as in Table 2 (M1-M6) (controls and fixed effects not shown).

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
### Table 4:
*Positional Deprivation* and Support or Vote for Parties in terms of *Net Nationalist Autarchy* platforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M13</th>
<th>M14</th>
<th>M15</th>
<th>M16</th>
<th>M17</th>
<th>M18</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positional Deprivation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean decile growth minus respondent's growth</td>
<td>0.060*</td>
<td>0.064*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th decile growth minus respondent's growth</td>
<td>0.088***</td>
<td>0.081***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st decile growth minus respondent's growth</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.044+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Subjective income/wellbeing</td>
<td>-0.216**</td>
<td>-0.198*</td>
<td>-0.250**</td>
<td>-0.126*</td>
<td>-0.114*</td>
<td>-0.179**</td>
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<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
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<td>-0.317***</td>
<td>-0.314***</td>
<td>-0.334***</td>
<td>-0.314***</td>
<td>-0.313***</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
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<td>(0.039)</td>
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<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.009+</td>
<td>0.008+</td>
<td>0.008+</td>
<td>0.009+</td>
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<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>-0.334***</td>
<td>-0.314***</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
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<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
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<td>(0.089)</td>
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<td>Foreign born</td>
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<td>0.191***</td>
<td>0.191***</td>
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<td>0.150***</td>
<td>0.150***</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-0.155*</td>
<td>-0.166*</td>
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<td>-0.194*</td>
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<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left-to-Right (manifesto)</td>
<td>0.323***</td>
<td>0.323***</td>
<td>0.322***</td>
<td>0.330***</td>
<td>0.330***</td>
<td>0.327***</td>
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<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-10.705***</td>
<td>-11.034***</td>
<td>-10.888***</td>
<td>-10.544***</td>
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<td>(0.621)</td>
<td>(0.623)</td>
<td>(0.640)</td>
<td>(0.517)</td>
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<td>(0.536)</td>
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<td>Country dummies</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS-round dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square</td>
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<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.42</td>
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</table>

DV for models M13-M15: *Net Nationalist Autarchy* score of party to which respondent feels closest DV for models M16-M18: *Net Nationalist Autarchy* score of party for which respondent voted.
All models (M13-M18): OLS with fixed effects for countries and survey waves, with OLS coefficients and standard errors clustered by country-year (in parentheses).

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 5: 
*Positional Inequality* and Support or Vote for Parties in terms of *Net Nationalist Autarchy* platforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M19</th>
<th>M20</th>
<th>M21</th>
<th>M22</th>
<th>M23</th>
<th>M24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positional Inequality X Subject Income</strong></td>
<td><strong>Net Nationalist Autarchy in platform of Party feel closest to</strong></td>
<td><strong>Party voted for</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective income/wellbeing</td>
<td>-0.240**</td>
<td>-0.215*</td>
<td>-0.245**</td>
<td>-0.132**</td>
<td>-0.130*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th-decile growth minus 1st decile growth</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.131**</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th-1st growth X Subject Income</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.018**</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10th-decile growth minus 5th decile growth</td>
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<td>0.094</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th-minus-5th growth X Subject Income</td>
<td>-0.020+</td>
<td>-0.025*</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5th-decile growth minus 1st decile growth</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.179**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th-minus-1st growth X Subject Income</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.014**</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-10.569***</td>
<td>-10.694***</td>
<td>-10.010***</td>
<td>-10.632***</td>
<td>-11.046***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.944)</td>
<td>(1.059)</td>
<td>(0.969)</td>
<td>(0.827)</td>
<td>(1.027)</td>
<td>(0.876)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS-round dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>46,979</td>
<td>46,979</td>
<td>46,979</td>
<td>64,410</td>
<td>64,410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DV for models M19-M21: *Net Nationalist Autarchy* score of party to which respondent feels closest
DV for models M22-M24: *Net Nationalist Autarchy* score of party for which respondent voted.
All models (M13-M18): OLS with fixed effects for countries and survey waves, with OLS coefficients and standard errors clustered by country-year (in parentheses). Controls and specification are same as for Table 4 (results for controls and dummies not shown).

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Figure 1:
Growth in Disposable Income by Decile, European-sample national means 1995-2005

European Means 1995-2005
by decile of the household income distribution

Source: LIS 2016, own calculations.

Figure 2:
Growth in Disposable Income by Decile, selected countries 1995-2005

United Kingdom 1995-2005
by decile of the household income distribution

France 1995-2005
by decile of the household income distribution

Ireland 1995-2005
by decile of the household income distribution

Germany 1995-2005
by decile of the household income distribution

Source: LIS 2016, own calculations.
Figure 3:
*Net Nationalist Autarchy, 2000-2012 per-party means*

Source: MPD data (Klingemann et al. 2006, updated), own calculations.
Figure 4: 
*Positional Deprivation* and Support or Vote for Radical Right Populist Parties

Source: own calculations

Figure 5: 
*Positional Inequality* and Support or Vote for Radical Right Populist Parties

Source: own calculations
Figure 6: Positional Deprivation and Support or Vote for Party in terms of Net Nationalist Autarchy

Source: own calculations

Figure 7: Positional Inequality and Support or vote for Party in terms of its Net Nationalist Autarchy

Source: own calculations.
Appendix One: Summary statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Stand.Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max</th>
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<tr>
<td>Party feel closest to…</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Right (1=RR; 0=any other party)</td>
<td>44,751</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net nationalist autarchy (in supported party)</td>
<td>48,411</td>
<td>-6.959</td>
<td>8.060</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party last voted for…</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Right (0=RR; 1=any other party)</td>
<td>66,800</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net nationalist autarchy (in voted-for party)</td>
<td>66,852</td>
<td>-6.790</td>
<td>7.819</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Positional Deprivation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean decile growth minus respondent's growth</td>
<td>86,627</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>4.345</td>
<td>-35.483</td>
<td>17.670</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th decile growth minus respondent's growth</td>
<td>86,627</td>
<td>-1.088</td>
<td>5.006</td>
<td>-44.346</td>
<td>22.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st decile growth minus respondent's growth</td>
<td>86,627</td>
<td>1.664</td>
<td>9.701</td>
<td>-30.699</td>
<td>28.039</td>
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<tr>
<td>Positional Inequality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th-decile growth minus 1st decile growth</td>
<td>86,627</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>13.948</td>
<td>-27.386</td>
<td>30.699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th-decile growth minus 5th decile growth</td>
<td>86,627</td>
<td>3.218</td>
<td>10.282</td>
<td>-17.302</td>
<td>44.346</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th-decile growth minus 1st decile growth</td>
<td>86,627</td>
<td>-2.393</td>
<td>8.879</td>
<td>-20.542</td>
<td>22.341</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual-level controls</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective wealth-wellbeing</td>
<td>86,627</td>
<td>3.171</td>
<td>0.782</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>86,318</td>
<td>3.087</td>
<td>1.373</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>86,583</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>86,627</td>
<td>48.546</td>
<td>17.345</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>86,598</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign born</td>
<td>86,600</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>86,325</td>
<td>4.898</td>
<td>2.941</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>86,521</td>
<td>0.638</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right identified</td>
<td>86,627</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right manifesto (excl. net nat. aut.) (feel close)</td>
<td>48,411</td>
<td>-4.546</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-42</td>
<td>56.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right manifesto (excl. net nat. autarch.) (vote)</td>
<td>66,852</td>
<td>-3.824</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-42</td>
<td>56.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate-level controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini inequality</td>
<td>86,627</td>
<td>28.636</td>
<td>3.583</td>
<td>22.500</td>
<td>35.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>86,627</td>
<td>2.863</td>
<td>3.521</td>
<td>-5.530</td>
<td>11.520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix Two:
Measuring net autarky and net nationalist autarky in party platforms

Net nationalist autarchy are measured as composite scores for additive elements of a party platform (measured as relevant sentences or sentence fragments, as a % of total sentences in platform).

Net nationalist autarchy = (per109 + per110 + per406 + per601 + per608 + per603 + per204) - (per107 + per108 + per407 + per602 + per404 + per607 + per201 + per202 + per203)

The Comparative Manifesto Project codebook words the parameters as follows (preceded, in parentheses, with the sign of whether the element is counted in the above composite as support for or opposition to nationalist autarchy).

(−) per107. Internationalism: Positive
Need for international co-operation; co-operation with specific countries other than those
coded in 101; need for aid to developing countries; need for world planning of resources;
need for international courts; support for any international goal or world state; support for
UN.

(+) per109. *Internationalism: Negative*
Favourable mentions of national independence and sovereignty as opposed to
internationalism; otherwise as 107, but negative.

(–) per108. *European Community: Positive*
Favourable mentions of European Community/European Union in general; desirability of
expanding the European Community/European Union and/or of increasing its competence;
desirability of the manifesto country joining or remaining a member.

(+) per110. *European Community: Negative*
Hostile mentions of the European Community/European Union; opposition to specific
European policies which are preferred by European authorities; otherwise as 108, but
negative.

(+) per406. *Protectionism: Positive*
Favourable mentions of extension or maintenance of tariffs to protect internal
markets; other domestic economic protectionism such as quota restrictions.

(–) per407. *Protectionism: Negative*
Support for the concept of free trade; otherwise as 406, but negative.

(+) per601. *National Way of Life: Positive*
Appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; suspension of some freedoms in
order to protect the state against subversion; support for established national ideas.

(–) per602. *National Way of Life: Negative*
Against patriotism and/or nationalism; opposition to the existing national state;
otherwise as 601, but negative.

(–) per607. *Multiculturalism: Positive*
Cultural diversity, communalism, cultural plurality and pillarization; preserva-
tion of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational
provisions.

(+) per608. *Multiculturalism: Negative*
Enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration; otherwise as 607, but negative.

(+) per603. *Traditional Morality: Positive*
Favourable mentions of traditional moral values; prohibition, censorship and suppression of
immorality and unseemly behaviour; maintenance and stability of family; religion.

(–) per604. *Traditional Morality: Negative*
Opposition to traditional moral values; support for divorce, abortion etc.; other-
wise as 603, but negative.
(-) per201. *Freedom and Human Rights*
Favourable mentions of importance of personal freedom and civil rights; freedom from bureaucratic control; freedom of speech; freedom from coercion in the political and economic spheres; individualism in the manifesto country and in other countries.

(-) per202. *Democracy*
Favourable mentions of democracy as a method or goal in national and other organisations; involvement of all citizens in decision-making, as well as generalized support for the manifesto country’s democracy.

(-) per203. *Constitutionalism: Positive*
Support for specific aspects of the constitution; use of constitutionalism as an argument for policy as well as general approval of the constitutional way of doing things.

(+ ) per204. *Constitutionalism: Negative*
Opposition to the constitution in general or to specific aspects; otherwise as 203, but negative.

**Appendix Three: Net Nationalist Autarchy and Radical right party family**

Figure A3: *Net Nationalist Autarchy* and the party families

Source: MPD data (Klingemann et al. 2006), own calculations.
Table A3: Net Nationalist Autarchy and Radical right Party support and vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M3</th>
<th>M4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual-level</strong></td>
<td><strong>Party feels closest to</strong></td>
<td><strong>Party voted for</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical right party</td>
<td>10.956*</td>
<td>9.440*</td>
<td>13.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.144)</td>
<td>(4.584)</td>
<td>(5.569)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left to Right (manifesto)</td>
<td>0.281***</td>
<td>-0.140*</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective wealth-wellbeing</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-0.151***</td>
<td>-0.087+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.151***</td>
<td>-0.087+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.288+</td>
<td>0.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.129+</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
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<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign born</td>
<td>-0.275</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.134***</td>
<td>0.096**</td>
<td>0.134***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>-0.349***</td>
<td>-0.148*</td>
<td>-0.301**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right self-placement</td>
<td>3.548***</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>3.244***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.556)</td>
<td>(0.659)</td>
<td>(0.408)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country-year level</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini inequality</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>-0.152</td>
<td>0.262*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-13.95***</td>
<td>-1.699</td>
<td>-18.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.850)</td>
<td>(4.513)</td>
<td>(3.503)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>.387***</td>
<td>.392***</td>
<td>.385***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>50270</td>
<td>50270</td>
<td>70590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DV for models M1-M2: Net Nationalist Autarchy score of party to which respondent feels closest
DV for models M3-M4: Net Nationalist Autarchy score of party for which respondent voted.
Random intercept OLS coefficients (robust-cluster standard errors in parentheses).

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001